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NOTES.

COMPENSATION TO THE ABUTTER FOR A NEW USE MADE OF THE

HIGHWAY.
In deciding whether an abutting property owner is entitled
to compensation when a new use is made of the street or highway by the public, or under public authority, it is repeatedly
stated that it is immaterial whether the fee is in the abutter
or the public.' Under the modern decisions the extent of the
rights of each in either case is about the same. Yet it is cer'Dillon on Municipal Corporations (4th Ed.), Sec. 7o4.
[116]

NOTES

tainly true that the character of the rights in each case is different and requires the application of entirely different principles.
When the fee is in the public, the only particular property
which the abutter owns, in addition to that which he enjoys as
a member of the public, is the easement of access, light and air,
appurtenant to his particular lot. It is an incorporeal right.
Whether any new use of the street or highway entitles him to
compensation, depends entirely upon whether this easement is2
obstructed. An elevated structure does impair this easement,
and the running of steam cars on the surface does not, per se.3
Horse and electric cars require no compensation to the owner,
neither do electric light or trolley poles, and therefore telephone
and telegraph poles should not.4 Obviously, a subway or any
structure under the surface of the street cannot obstruct this
easement. Whether there has been an exclusive and permanent
appropriation of any part of the fee; whether the use is consistent with the purpose of the highway; whether it is in the
country or the city; whether it. is to supply a service to the
locality or only to a distant place; are questions which are not
involved.
But if the abutter owns the fee, his rights are corporeal, and
the right of access, light and air belong to him as part of his
enjoyment of that fee. The public has only an easement. Any
exclusive appropriation of the soil is a trespass, unless it
is within or incident to that easement. A use which improves
the street as a place for travel, as, for example, facilities for
lighting, draining, etc., is considered to be incident to the
easement. The authorities also agree that the same facility
may be used for local domestic or municipal needs without
compensation to the abutter, on the ground that the accruing
benefits fully compensate him. And it is only necessary that the
facility be available for a street use, though not actually used
at the time.5 If the construction is to supply distant places only,
it is an additional servitude, because there is no local benefit.'
2Story v. N. Y. Elevated Ry., go N. Y., 122.
'Williams v. City Electric Street Ry. Co., 41 Fed.., 556; Reining v.
N. Y., Lack. & W. R. R., 128 N. Y., 157 (i8gi); Fobes v. R. R. Co., 121
N. Y., 505 (890).
'Gay %%
Mutual Union Tel. Co., 12 Mo. Ap., 485; Board of Trade
Tel. Co. v. Burnet, 107 IIl., 507 (1883).
'Wilcher v. Holland Water Co., 66 Hun, 619 (1893), i42 N. Y., 626
(894).
'Sterling's Appeal, 1ii Pa., 35 (i885); Van Brunt v. Town of Flatbush, 128 N. Y., 50 (i8gi); Palmer v. Larchmont Electric Co., 158

N. Y., 231 (899).
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But even if a construction does supply a local domestic or
municipal purpose, it is an additional servitude, if it does not
at the same time supply a street use, but instead is independent
of such a use. A telephone is said to be within that rule;
Osborne v. The Auburn Telephone Co., io9 N. Y. 393, i9o7.
But a telephone, in supplying a ready means for notifying the
proper authorities of defects, etc., does make possible aspeedi~r
repair when needed; and therefore a contrary decision might
have been reached. The same jurisdiction has consistently
held that street passenger railways are not incident or within
the public easement, whether steam,7 electric,8 or horse.' The
change of motive power is not material, or automobiles would
raise the question. The weight of authority holds that such
do facilitate travel along the highway, and therefore are incident and within the public easement, 10 unless the particular
kind of railway is inconsistent with the purpose of the highway
for local traffic. Accordingly a steam railroad, because of the
speed and infrequency of the stops, is held to be an additional
burden." But these jurisdictions are in accord with the principal case as to telephones.' 2 Some jurisdictions have gone
further and held that the public easement not only includes all
modes of transportation, but also all modes of inter-communication; and therefore allow no compensation for a telephone.'8
The correctness of the above decisions depends upon whether
the extent of the public easement is determined by the extent
of the terms of the original grant, or by reasoning as to what it
should be. If the right of the public was obtained under eminent domain proceedings, the statute should control the extent
of the right acquired; and since it is taken in derogation of
private right, it must be construed strictly.' 4 A use for a different purpose imposes an additional burden.' However, if the
right was dedicated to the public by the owner, there is no necessary reason for a strict construction.' 6 It was a willing act.
'Williams v. N. Y. Central R. R., 16 N. Y., 97 (857).
'Peck v. Schenectady Ry. Co., 17o N. Y., ng8 (19o2); Paige v.
Schenectady Ry. Co., 178 N. Y., io2 (19o4).
'Craig v. Rochester City R. R. Co., 39 N. Y., 4o4 (1868).
"Halsey v. Rapid Transit Street Ry. Co., 47 N. J. Eq. 38o (189o).
'Taggart v. Newport Street Ry. Co., i9 Ati. (R. I.), 326 (18go).
"Nicoll v. N. Y. & N. J. Tel. Co., 42 Atl. (N. J.), 583 (1894);
Postal Tel. Co. v. Eaton, 170 II1., 513 (1897).
'Pierce v. Drew, 126 Mass., 75 (1883).
"Lance's Appeal, 55 Pa., x6 (1867).
"State v. Laverack, 34 N. J. L, 2oi (i87o).
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The same applies to a limited extent to an easement obtained by
prescription. It is certainly desirable that the public easement
should be as broad as possible. Streets and highways are the
natural places for the constructions required by the various
public utilities. Private rights are least interfered with, because
the streets are already surrendered to public uses. For that
reason, damages are generally nominal, when an additional
servitude is held to be imposed.' 7 Condemnation proceedings
are expensive and seem to be unnecessary. Yet, a decision
which upholds the rights of private property, even for purely
technical reasons, is not to be condemned. The remedy lies
with the legislature. Statutes should provide for the taking of
the fee, whenever land is taken for street or highway.

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A STATE APPROPRIATION TO A PRIVATE ASSOCIATION.

The decision of the supreme court of Michigan in the case
of Michigan Corn Improvement Association v. Auditor General,
113 N. W. 582, presents in a new form the question of the constitutional limitation on legislatures in the matter of granting
bounties to associations representing particular industries. The
statute to be decided upon was one appropriating five hundred
dollars a year, for the years of 1907 and 19o8, "for the use of
the Michigan Corn Improvement Association in the prosecution
of its work of creating a deeper interest in and a better knowledge of the culture and improvement of corn ;" the sums to be
expended "under the direction of the board of directors of said
association in such way as in its judgment will most effectually
attain the ends sought." The beneficiary is a voluntary, unincorporated association, whose membership is limited to "persons
actively interested in the improvement of corn and residents of
the State of Michigan," and whose objects are: (I) "To stimulate effort to improve the quality of the corn crop and increase
the yield of both grain and fodder; (2) to develop better methods of culture and disseminate the knowledge of the same; (3)
by meetings and discussions to arouse a deeper interest and
develop a more thorough unity of effort in corn production; and
(4) to establish ideals for both ear and plant for the different
varieties and breeds." At its annual meeting is held a corn
"Dillon on Municipal Corporations (4th Ed.), Sec. 722.
"Eels v. A. T. & T. Co., 143 N. Y., 133 (1894).
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exhibit, at which prizes are offered, to its members only, for the
best exhibit of corn.
The court held the act unconstitutional, as discriminating in
favor of one industry; "the only persons," it said, "who will be
directly benefited by the proposed appropriation are those
'actively interested in the improvement of corn.'" This is practically all that the court says of its own motion, the case being
ruled directly, in its judgment, by the leading decision in the
state on the subject of bounties, the People v. Salem, 2o Michigan, 452 (187o). In the latter case the court, in a vigorous
opinion delivered by Judge Cooley, refused to recognize the
constitutionality of an act authorizing certain counties to levy
a tax to aid in the construction of a railroad. In the course of
the opinion, Judge Cooley announced the principle that the state
has no power to grant bounties, such as "to furnish the capital
to set private parties up in any kind of business, or to subsidize
their business after they have entered upon it." It was after
quoting this decision that the present court decided the corn
case.
The principle has long been recognized that neither taxation
nor appropriation by the legislature is valid if made for any
save a directly public purpose. "Because," says the United
States Supreme Court,' "such a tax would, if collected, be the
transfer of the property of individuals to aid in the projects of
gain and profit of others," and hence a taking of property without just compensation. But the determination in each particular instance of the true question as to what is and what is not a
"public purpose," is ordinarily one of legislative discretion, unhampered by judicial interference. "The tax must be considered valid, unless it is for a purpose in which the community
taxed has palpably no interest; where it is apparent that a burden is imposed for the benefit of others, and where it would be
so pronounced at first blush."' 2 Hence the tendency of the
courts is to sustain the legislation whenever possible, and we
have a large number of reported cases in which they have
refused to hold the statute invalid, because it did not appear to
be a gross abuse of discretion.
Thus the general rule as to legislation in aid of railroads is
different from that laid down in Michigan.3 While acts have
'Loan Association v. Topeka, 2o Wallace, 655 (1874).
2
Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphia,21 Pa., 168 (1853).

'Taylor v.'Ypsilanti, U. S., 6o (188I)
; Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, 676 note; Stockton R. R. v. Stockton, 4r Cal., 147 (1871).
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been held valid which granted bounties to public grist-mills 4
(though these are now mostly obsolete 5) ; to volunteers in time
of war ;Gand to various local industries, such as the culture of
silk ;7 wherever, in short, any direct public benefit could be discerned as accruing from the legislation. On the other hand, in
the absence of such direct benefit, however great may be the
incidental advantage to the public, the statute is ordinarily held
unconstitutional." But it is to be noted that these cases all deal
with legislation whose avowed object is to assist some private
commercial enterprise, and as such the Michigan court seems to
have viewed the act in question. Should it affect the decision
in any way, if it be considered that the purpose of the association which was being benefited was at least as much educational
as commercial? That it was "to disseminate knowledge" and
"to establish ideals," as well as "to stimulate effort ?"
Bounties to agricultural societies have been held valid,9 where
they have been incorporated, and one of the terms of the charter
is the holding of an annual fair, the theory being that it is of
great benefit to the entire commonwealth that progressive interest in farming be stimulated. Moreover, this is in no sense a
single industry, but rather a phase of national life. Educational
institutions, also, are the lawful recipients of state funds, but
only where they are under the control of the state or municipality. 1 Whenever they partake of the nature of private foundations, they come within the constitutional prohibition. Thus,
in Curtisv. Whipple,an act authorizing a bonus to aid the Jefferson Liberal Institute was declared void because, though a school
of learning, it was a private enterprise; the court distinguishing
direct public benefits, such as might accrue were the school
under direct municipal control and subject to public requirements as to who should and who should not be admitted, from
those incidentally due to the existence of an institution of learning in the comiunity. And in Jenkins v. Anderson, the aid was
'Burlington Township v. Beasley, 94 U. S., 310 (1876).
'Gray-Limitations of the Taxing Power, 135, 191 (i9o6).
'Booth v. Woodbury, 32 Com., 118 (1864); Brodhead v. Milwaukee,

1g Wis., 624 (1865).

"Stockton R. R. v. Stockton, 41 Cal., 147 (1871).

'Deering v. Peterson, 77 N. W. (Minn.), 568 (1898); Michigan Sugar
Co. v. Auditor General, 124 Mich., 674 (igoo); Loan Association v.
Topeka, supra.
"Hixonv. Eagle River, 91 Wis., 649.
"'Curtis v. Whipple, 24 Wis., 350 (1869); Jenkins v. Anderson, 1O3
Mass., 74.
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denied to a school established by funds provided by the will of
a citizen, because the governing board consisted of trustees
appointed by the will.
Thus the distinction is one in kind, and not in degree; the
public benefit must be clear, direct and unmistakable; no
amount of incidental advantage to the community will avail. It
would seem, therefore, that even viewing this as an association
largely educational in its nature, and approaching the criticism
of the statute on general principles of common law, thus laying
aside the anomalous ruling of The People v. Salem, its constitutionality could not be sustained. It is most obviously special
legislation in favor of a limited group of individuals, and although the group is capable of enlargement, the object to be
attained is not. "The right to tax depends on the ultimate use,
purpose and object for which the fund is raised, and not on the
nature or character of the person or corporation whose intermediate agency is to be used in applying it" 11

DOCTRINE OF PRICE V. NEAL; EFFECT OF INDORSEMENT BY

HOLDER.
The doctrine of Price v. Neal I to the effect that the drawee
of a bill of exchange or check of whici the drawer's signature
is forged cannot recover the money paid by him to the holder
is well established. To this doctrine, however, there are exceptions, which unfortunately stand on more precarious footing,
and are more uncertain in their applications. In general, these
exceptions arise out of negligence or bad faith on the part of
the holder. Thus, where by custom a duty of precaution is
thrown upon a collecting bank which it neglects, 2 or where the
circumstances are such as to put the holder on suspicion and he
fails to exercise due diligence,' the case is taken outside the
general rule. It has been held that a further exception exists
where the instrument is endorsed by the holder, on the ground
that the signature amounts to a guaranty of genuineness.
The recent case of Williamsburgh Trust Co. v. Turn Suden,
12o N. Y. App. Div. 518, sanctions this view. The idea that the
1

Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphia,21 Pa., I68 (853).

13

Burr, 1354.

2Ellis v. Ohio Ins. Co., 4 Ohio, 628.
Bangs, io6 Mass., 441; Rouvant v. San
'Nat. Bank of N. America N%
Antonio Nat. Bank, 63 Tex., 612.
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signature of the holder is a warranty of the genuineness of the
note seems to arise from a misunderstanding of the purpose of
the signature. Manifestly it is not an indorsement in any
proper sense, for that term applies only to an instrument which
has not yet come to maturity.4 Nor can it be a guaranty, for to
hold so is to disregard the common understanding of the effect
of the signature, which is that it is a receipt. 5 "One of the best
receipts is the placing on the back of the bill the name of the
person who has received payment of it." An illustration will
serve to refute the idea that the signature is anything but a
receipt; surely it would not be contended that a drawee who
had paid out funds to a greater amount than the drawee's account, could recover the money on the ground that the payee's
signature amounted to a guaranty that the drawer was in funds.Moreover, if the signature be an indorsement, then because by
custom the holder places his signature upon the check, the doctrine of Price v. Neal is virtually "excepted out of existence."
While the view that the signature is a guaranty is not without
judicial sanction, 7 it is submitted that almost without exception
the cases usually cited by text-writers do not really substantiate
this proposition. There are generally in these cases either negligence on the part of the holder at the time of taking the instrument,8 or knowledge of suspicious facts at the time of receiving
the money. 9 Moreover, if the opinions in these cases are read
as a whole they will be found not to support the doctrine that
the signature per se enables the drawee to recover, but merely
that the signature "is a fact that tends to show that the appellee
(the drawee) was guilty of no negligence in paying the
check,"'1 and thus is important only "where the indorsement is
made under circumstances which establish or impute negligence
to the in-dorser.""1
It is submitted further that the force of the recent case is
'Daniel on Negot. Ins., (5th Ed.), 666.
'Story on Prom. Notes, (7th Ed.), 526, note 5; Chitty on Bills

(Ist Ed.), 157 (1799).
'Keene v. Beard, 8 C. B. N. S. 372, 382.
'FirstNat. Bank v. First Nat. Bank, 4 Ind. App., 355.
'Nat.Bank v. Bangs (supra); Danvers v. Salem Bank, 151 Mass.,
28o, at 283.

'Rouvant v. Bank (supra).
"First Nat. Bank of Quincy v. Ricker, 71 Ill., 439; Nat. Bank v.
Bangs (supra), at 445, intimating that had the holder been without
fault, recovery would have been refused.
'People's Nat. Bank v. Franklin Bank, 88 Tenn., 299, at 306.
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weakened by the fact that the court seems in part to have rested
its decision on the fact that the holder was also the payee. Even
this ground, however, seems questionable, for while in many
instances the equity of the payee-holder may be inferior to that
of the holder who is not a payee, this cannot be stated as an
inflexible legal principle. Thus, while it is true that where the
check is negotiated to the payee by a stranger, there is something suspicious in the very nature of the transaction, 12 there
would be nothing to put the payee on guard where the check
was presented by an agent of the drawer and paid to the drawer's use.
The case is also of interest to the student of the doctrine of
Price v. Neal in that it suggests that where the holder has customarily cashed checks for the drawer, he is held to a knowledge of the drawer's signature and cannot shift that duty to the
drawee.

THE LIABILITY OF A CHARITY FOR THE NEGLIGENCE OF ITS
SERVANTS.

In the case of Tozeland v. Guardiansof the Poorof the West
Ham Union,' the question of the liability of a charity for the
negligence of its servants came before the Court of King's
Bench on appeal. The facts were as follows: The plaintiff, an
inmate of a workhouse and recipient of poor law relief, was
directed to assist at the installation of electric lights in the
infirmary under the management of one Byers, the resident electrician. By the English poor law paupers who refused to work
when assigned to a job could be brought before a magistrate
and committed to jail. At the direction of Byers the plaintiff
mounted a scaffold which, being insecurely constructed through
the negligence of the electrician, collapsed, injuring the plaintiff, who then sued the guardians of the local union for damages. On appeal, a verdict in favor of the plaintiff was reversed
on the ground that the plaintiff in entering the workhouse as an
inmate assumed the risk of negligence on the part of the guardians and their employees, or, at least, that the union owed no
duty of care to him and hence he could not recover.
Though the rule that one who takes advantage of the benefits
offered by a public or private charity cannot recover against it
'Nat. Bank v. Bangs (supra), 445.
L. R. (i9o7), I K. B., 92o.

1
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for the negligence of its servants (at least if the latter were
properly selected) is now pretty well settled, the courts are by
no means agreed upon the reason for the rule. Three grounds
have been assigned: (i) It is against public policy, which desires to foster charitable work in every possible way ;2 (2) the
funds of a charity are trust funds and may not be diverted from
the purpose for which they were appropriated;3 (3) a person
entering a charity in fact assumes the risk of any injury that he
may receive through the negligence of the charity's servants.4
At least one of these reasons seems to be bad in theory. As has
been pointed out,5 a trustee is individually liable for torts committed in the management of trust property, and though the
trust fund is protected from immediate levy, he can reimburse
himself therefrom unless individually at fault. Hence the mere
fact that the charity is supported wholly or in part through trust
funds should not in itself be a ground for non-liability. Either
under this or the public policy theory the result would be the
same, whether the injury was to an outsider or one who has
accepted the benefit of the charity, and so it has been held.'
Under the "risk theory," however-and this is the theory of the
English case-the charity should be liable to an outsider, since
he, having entered into no relations with the institution in question, cannot have assumed any risk. This, indeed, seems to be
the law in England-the court in the main case carefully distinguishing as inapplicable the case of Mersey Dock Trustees
v. Gibbs,7 where a dock company performing public functions
was held liable for the negligence of its servants resulting in
injury to an outsider. A similar result is suggested in Powers
v. MassachusettsHomoeopathic Hospital,8 though in that case
the injury was to a hospital patient, and hence the remark is
mere dicta. It is, however, interesting to note that the few cases
which have held that a charity was liable for the negligence of

"Fordyce v. Woman's Christian Library Association, 96 S. W. 155
(Arkansas, i9o6) ; Hearns v. Waterbury Hospital, 66 Conn., 98.
'Parks v. N. W. University, 12 Ill. App., 512; McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 120 Mass., 432.
"Powers v. Massachusetts Homeopathic Hospital, 47 C. C. A., 122;
Cumier v. Dartmouth College, 1O5 Fed., 886.
"Powers v. Hospital, 47 C. C. A., at i29.
"Noble v. Hahnemann Hospital, 98 N. Y. Suppl., 605; Fordyce v.
Woman's Christian Library Assoc., 96 S. W., 155.
(i866)L. R. H. L., 93.

'47 C C.A., 132.
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its servants are all, except the English case cited,9 cases of in10
juries to persons obtaining the benefit of a private charity. In
the case of charitable institutions supported wholly or in part
by the state or a municipality, the American courts have uniformly denied liability."- It would seem, then, that the principal case is in accord with all the authorities in its facts, but
becomes an intensely interesting one by reason of its dicta
denying the applicability of the rule to the case of injury to an
outsider.
'Mersey Docks Trustees v. Gibbs (1866) L R. I, H. L. 93.
"Donaldson v. General Public Hospital, 30 New Brunswick, 279;
Hewett v. Woman's Hospital Assoc., 73 N. H., 556. The case of
Glavin v. Rhode Island Hospital, 12 R. I., 411, holding that a hospital
is liable for negligence of its doctor, resulting in injury to a patient,
has been overruled by statute in Rhode Island. The case could hardly
be considered as contra, however, since the decision is largely based
on the fact that due care was not exercised in the selection of the
doctor in question. In accordance with this last proposition there is
an abundance of dicta: (Van Tassel v. Manhattan Hospital, I5 N. Y.
Supp., 62o; Wilson v. Brooklyn Homeopathic Hospital, 89 N. Y. Supp.,
619).
'Penn v. House of Refuge, 63 Md., 2o; Fbrd v. School District, 121
Pa., 543; Maia v. State Hospital, 97 Va., 507; Peasley v. Poor District,
26 Pa. Co., 428; Corbett v. Industrial School, 177 N. Y., i6; White
v. Hospital, 138 Ala., 479. (The suit in all these cases was, however,
by an employee or a person receiving the benefit of the institution.)

